**# Latife Kınay Kılıç- Response to Sponsorship Dataset (RSD)

gen logcoercive=0
replace logcoercive=1 if coercive==1 | mixed_response==1

**# Table 4: Intentional Support versus DE facto Support and Coercive Target Responses
logit logcoercive S_SafeMem S_SafeLead S_Offices S_TrainCamp S_Training S_WeaponLog S_FinAid S_Transport S_Troop time time2 time3, cluster(triadid)

outreg2 using Table4.doc, e(ll)replace ctitle(Model 1) keep(S_SafeMem S_SafeLead S_Offices S_TrainCamp S_Training S_WeaponLog S_FinAid S_Transport S_Troop time time2 time3) label alpha(0.001, 0.01,0.05) symbol(***, **, *)

logit logcoercive DS_SafeMem DS_SafeLead DS_Offices DS_TrainCamp DS_Training DS_WeaponLog DS_FinAid DS_Transport  time time2 time3, cluster(triadid) 

outreg2 using Table4.doc, e(ll)append ctitle(Model 2) keep(DS_SafeMem DS_SafeLead DS_Offices DS_TrainCamp DS_Training DS_WeaponLog DS_FinAid DS_Transport time time2 time3) label alpha(0.001, 0.01,0.05) symbol(***, **, *)

logit logcoercive S_SafeMem S_SafeLead S_Offices S_TrainCamp S_Training S_WeaponLog S_FinAid S_Transport S_Troop border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3, cluster(triadid)
 
outreg2 using Table4.doc, e(ll)append ctitle(Model 3) keep(S_SafeMem S_SafeLead S_Offices S_TrainCamp S_Training S_WeaponLog S_FinAid S_Transport S_Troop border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3) label alpha(0.001, 0.01,0.05) symbol(***, **, *)

logit logcoercive DS_SafeMem DS_SafeLead DS_Offices DS_TrainCamp DS_Training DS_WeaponLog DS_FinAid DS_Transport border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3, cluster(triadid)

outreg2 using Table4.doc, e(ll)append ctitle(Model 4) keep(DS_SafeMem DS_SafeLead DS_Offices DS_TrainCamp DS_Training DS_WeaponLog DS_FinAid DS_Transport border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3) label alpha(0.001, 0.01,0.05) symbol(***, **, *)

**Figure 1
logit logcoercive S_SafeMem S_SafeLead S_Offices S_TrainCamp S_Training S_WeaponLog S_FinAid S_Transport S_Troop border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3, cluster(triadid)
margins, at(S_SafeMem=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g1)
margins, at(S_SafeLead=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g2)
margins, at(S_Offices=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g3)
margins, at(S_TrainCamp=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g4)
margins, at(S_Training=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g5)
margins, at(S_WeaponLog=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g6)
margins, at(S_FinAid=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g7)
margins, at(S_Transport=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g8)
margins, at(S_Troop=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g9)
gr combine g1.gph g2.gph g3.gph g4.gph g5.gph g6.gph g7.gph  g8.gph  g9.gph 

**Appendix C 
logit logcoercive S_SafeMem S_SafeLead S_Offices S_TrainCamp S_Training S_WeaponLog S_FinAid S_Transport S_Troop border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3, cluster(triadid)
margins, at(polity_target=(-88(1)10)) 
marginsplot, saving (G1)
margins, at(border_share=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (G2)
margins, at(gdp_pc_target=(.0228504(5)50.43537))
marginsplot, saving (G3)
margins, at(powerratio=(.0019675 (50)1655.553))
marginsplot, saving (G4)
margins, at(gdp_pc_supporter=(.0228504(5)96.9441))
marginsplot, saving (G5)
margins, at(polity_supporter=(-88(1)10))
marginsplot, saving (G6)
gr combine G1.gph G2.gph G3.gph G4.gph G5.gph G6.gph
 

** Figure 2

logit logcoercive DS_SafeMem DS_SafeLead DS_Offices DS_TrainCamp DS_Training DS_WeaponLog DS_FinAid DS_Transport border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3, cluster(triadid)
margins, at(DS_SafeMem=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g1)
margins, at(DS_SafeLead=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g2)
margins, at(DS_Offices=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g3)
margins, at(DS_TrainCamp=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g4)
margins, at(DS_Training=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g5)
margins, at(DS_WeaponLog=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g6)
margins, at(DS_FinAid=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g7)
margins, at(DS_Transport=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (g8)

gr combine g1.gph g2.gph g3.gph g4.gph g5.gph g6.gph g7.gph g8.gph  

**Appendix D 
logit logcoercive DS_SafeMem DS_SafeLead DS_Offices DS_TrainCamp DS_Training DS_WeaponLog DS_FinAid DS_Transport border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3, cluster(triadid)
margins, at(polity_target=(-88(1)10)) 
marginsplot, saving (G1)
margins, at(border_share=(0 1))
marginsplot, saving (G2)
margins, at(gdp_pc_target=(.0228504(5)50.43537))
marginsplot, saving (G3)
margins, at(powerratio=(.0019675 (50)1655.553))
marginsplot, saving (G4)
margins, at(gdp_pc_supporter=(.0228504(5)96.9441))
marginsplot, saving (G5)
margins, at(polity_supporter=(-88(1)10))
marginsplot, saving (G6)
gr combine G1.gph G2.gph G3.gph G4.gph G5.gph G6.gph


**Table 6: The Impact of Support Level on the Severity of Target Responses 
mlogit severity_response sup_level time time2 time3 if intentional==1, base(0) cluster(triadid) 
outreg2 using T.doc, e(ll)replace ctitle(Model 1) keep(sup_level time time2 time3) label alpha(0.001, 0.01,0.05) symbol(***, **, *)

mlogit severity_response sup_level border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter  time time2 time3 if intentional==1, base(0) cluster(triadid) 
outreg2 using T.doc, e(ll)append ctitle(Model 2) keep(sup_level border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter time time2 time3) label alpha(0.001, 0.01,0.05) symbol(***, **, *)


**Figure 3
mlogit severity_response sup_level border_share powerratio polity_target polity_supporter gdp_pc_target gdp_pc_supporter  time time2 time3 if intentional==1, base(0) cluster(triadid) 
margins, predict(outcome(0)) at(sup_level=(0(1)3))
marginsplot, title("") ytitle("Predicted Probability of Inaction") xtitle ("Support Level") recast(line) ciopt(color(gray) lpattern(dash)) recastci(rline) scheme(s2mono) graphregion(fcolor(white)) saving (inaction)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) at(sup_level=(0(1)3))
marginsplot, title("") ytitle("Predicted Probability of Non-Coercive Response") xtitle ("Support Level") recast(line) ciopt(color(gray) lpattern(dash)) recastci(rline) scheme(s2mono) graphregion(fcolor(white)) saving (non-coercive)
margins, predict(outcome(2)) at(sup_level=(0(1)3))
marginsplot, title("") ytitle("Predicted Probability of Coercive Response") xtitle ("Support Level") recast(line) ciopt(color(gray) lpattern(dash)) recastci(rline) scheme(s2mono) graphregion(fcolor(white)) saving (coercive)
margins, predict(outcome(3)) at(sup_level=(0(1)3))
marginsplot, title("") ytitle("Predicted Probability of Mixed Response") xtitle ("Support Level") recast(line) ciopt(color(gray) lpattern(dash)) recastci(rline) scheme(s2mono) graphregion(fcolor(white)) saving (mixed)
gr combine inaction.gph non-coercive.gph coercive.gph mixed.gph, col(3)


**Appendix B
gen rebel_diplomacy=0 
replace rebel_diplomacy=1 if S_Offices==1 | DS_Offices==1

gen robust_diplo=0
replace robust_diplo=1 if S_Offices==1

sum rivalry formal_alliance border_share intentional defacto NAGObj3_4 polity_target polity_supporter Supporter_PITF Target_PITF powerratio gdp_pc_supporter gdp_pc_target NAGID_3 sup_level rebel_diplomacy robust_diplo
